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SKEPTICAL ATARAXIA
AND SELFHOOD IN
POPE'S
IMITATIONS OF HORACE
James Noggle

Iriticism of Pope has long noted his intensely self-divided
1 attitudes and considered them a source of his poetry's appeal.
!Early in the seventies S. L. Goldberg stressed the "thoroughly
dialectical" cast of Pope's imagination, and before that Thomas R.
Edwards's This Dark Estate: A Reading of Pope (1963) insisted on the
significance of his ambivalence about his own "Augustan" values.'
' Goldberg's phrase appears in his "Integrity and Life in Pope's Poetry," (in Pope: Recent
Essays by Several Hands, Hamden: Archon, 1980, Maynard Mack and James Winn, eds. 31),
but many other critics make the point. For example, Thomas R. Edwards cites a conflict
present from early on in Pope's career between Augustan "amplitude and equanimity" and
"an anxious, 'modern' concern about the workings of mutability" (2, This Dark Estate: A
Reading of Pope, Berkeley: University of Califc)rnia Press, 1963). Reuben Brower notes local
tensions between Pope's fluid Horatian manner and the dogmatic philosophizing of the Essay
on Man; in the more purely Horatian efforts Pope "won his way out of argument into a
freedom which he exploited more happily and more seriously in poems where he felt less
obliged to play the dogmatic philosopher" (239, Alexander Pope: The Poetry of Allusion,
London; Oxford University Press, 1959). Patricia Meyer Spacks's An Argument of Images:
The Poetry of Alexander Pope (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) analyzes Pope's
imagery in terms of the complementary tension between "energy" and "restraint," which, she
says, presented "a problem crucial to the thought of the early eighteenth century...energy
demanded control while control became meaningless without energy" (2). The dialectical
tension between reason and passion in Pope's thought is discussed, for example, by Rebecca
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Recent critics have given this portrait a range of political inflections;
perhaps most famously, Laura Brown in her Alexander Pope (1985)
argues that his work reveals the contradictions inherent in the
ideology he espoused, focusing on (for example) "the implicit
ambivalence of Pope's imperialist poems. In the introduction to the
collection Critical Essays on Alexander Pope (1993), the editor Wallace
Jackson neatly summarizes the recent trend to view Pope's
equivocations ideologically:
"the poems articulate a political
unconscious by involuntarily revealing obsessive associations that they
cannot otherwise (that is, consciously) disclose. Note that it is often
the poems and not Pope who does this, but the point is that Pope
cannot do it, which is what is meant by 'self-divided.Earlier critics
had found subconscious forces at work in Pope that were less
ideologically charged, and had sometimes gropingly described them
as necessarily unaware anticipations of Romanticism—even
"existentialism." But both recent critics and their precursors have
portrayed Pope's self-dividedness as not entirely intentional, and
instead presented it as coming generally from his "poetic richness" or
his centrality in an ideologically constructed (hence self-contradicting)
canon."*
My account will suggest ways in which Pope indeed chose
equivocation, in support of an ideological position no less
conservative but much more subtle and unstable than the one
regularly ascribed to him: I will make the case that the divided self
he deployed (specifically in the Imitations of Horace ) came in part
from the Pyrrhonist attitudes he found in his favorite author
Ferguson in The Unbalanced Mind: Pope and the Rule of Passion (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester,
1986). Of course these and many other oppositions applied to Pope by critics all carry
slightly different valences, but they make a general point that to read Pope well is to
appreciate his commitment to incommensurable alternatives—a view that I share and seek
here to develop.
' Laura Brown, Alexander Pope (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 27.
' Wallace Jackson, "Introduction," Critical Essays on Alexander Pope (New York: Macmillan,
1993), 5. In this Jackson is elaborating on points made by Robert Markley in his essay
included in this volume, "Beyond Consensus: The Rape (f the Lock and the Fate of Reading
Eighteenth-Century Literature," 69-83.
•" Brown's "attack" on Pope is clear on this point: "Pope has been the centre of the canon
in traditional eighteenth-century literary history for good reason, it seems. This study keeps
him there. But it keeps him as a subversive, as a lever against the whole canon of eighteenthcentury studies" (5). Her idea is that Pope can be used this way because his poetry encodes
the ideological contradictions of his culture.
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Montaigne— leading him not, of course, to profess Pyrrhonism
explicitly, but to adopt an authorial persona rife with skeptical
ironies. The ancient skeptic recognizes radical discontinuities within
himself but only in order to secure, paradoxically, the virtuous,
becalmed integrity {ataraxia) sought by all the philosophical schools
of antiquity. In Pocockian ideological terms, ancient skepticism
allowed Pope to express his ofhcial support for Roman Republican,
anti-commercial, "civic" conceptions of virtue while entertaining the
speculative, unstable, epistemologically unraveling forces that he saw
rampant in his culture.^ Since skeptical philosophy has always
advised extreme conservatism, finding the status quo to be the safest
bet in a radically dubious world, my ascription of it to Pope in some
sense matches the prevalent views of him from Brown and others.
But the skeptic's undermining of all justification makes him at best an
ambiguous ally of the civic order, and Pope's doubts often expose the
unjustifiability of dominant cultural ideals even in being used to
enunciate his allegiance to them.
These exposures, I think, ultimately create the unconscious eddies
that pull Pope into some of the ideological contradictions described
by the critics—and so I propose that his unconscious self-divisions
develop on a finely shaded continuum from his more conscious ones.
Further, I think that he is willing to begin this slide because it seems
to him appealingly close to a sort of poetic inspiration: the skeptic,
in Stanley Cavell's formulation, does not really "mean what he says,"
and below I will suggest how Pope's cultural values encouraged him
to view such a loss of intentional control as a mark of genius—a
valuation of impersonal, detached self-transcendence prevalent across
a wide diversity of the literary projects of modernity, from
eighteenth-century constructions of Shakespeare to deconstruction and
beyond. But first I will show how ancient skepticism helps Pope
promote a quasi-aesthetic attitude of self-division as appropriate not
just in literary but in all gentlemanly circumstances.
' See especially J. G. A. Pocock's Virtue, Commerce, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), chapters 2 and 3.
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In his Pope and Horace (1985), Frank Stack has rightly stressed the
connection between the Imitations' complex explorations of selfhood
and the eudaemonistic, self-disciplinary motivations of the ancient
schools. As Stack notes, the phrase Horace uses to refer to the
consistent self most often is cequus animus, which Pope translates in
the following lines on Bethel from his imitation of Satire Ilii: "His
equal mind I copy all I can, / And as I love, would imitate the Man"
(131-2).^ For Pope, having an equal mind is equivalent to locating
one's "true inner self"^ (in Stack's phrase) because it assures one of
personal coherence or identity through time regardless of changing
fortune: according to the ancient schools, personal coherence is the
necessary condition for a virtuous life.^ Conversely, disequilibrium
in our moral being threatens our sense of identity, as in Pope's
imitation of Epistle Ivi: "Thus good, or bad, to one extreme betray
/ Th'unbalanc'd Mind, and snatch the Man away" (24-5). This
identification of virtue with a sense of selfhood in part distinguishes
Pope's discourse in the Imitations from more purely epistemological
debates about personal identity begun by Locke in the Essay
Concerning Human Understanding (2nd ed., 1694), who found the
language of personhood (especially in its forensic function) to be
incommensurable with the language of substance.' "While some critics
' Here and throughout, I use the text of Pope's poems as presented in the Twickenham
Edition cf the Poems of Alexander Pope, 10 vols. (London: Methuen, 1939-1967), John Butt,
gen. ed., herein abbreviated TE.
' Frank Stack, Pope and Horace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 75.
' See Seneca's Epistles to Lucilius, cxx (quoted by Pope and Bolingbroke in a letter jointly
•written to Swift [August 1723, Correspondence cf Alexander Pope, 5 vols., Oxford: Clarendon,
1956, George Sherburn, ed., vol. 2, 187-8] and cited by Stack) for a quick index to the ancient
identification of virtue with personal identity, in which Seneca raises the issue specifically
commenting upon a Horatian text {Satire liii, 11-17).
' Locke's chapter xxvii of Book II of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, "Of
Identity and Diversity," virtually invents the terms of the modern debate on personal identity
that •were taken up by Bishop Butler, Hume, Reid, and other notables of the century, and
are still current in some philosophical circles. Locke concluded famously that reflection
affords us no unitary idea of self as substance and that our sense of personal identity instead
arises from "unity of consciousness"—what later philosophers (perhaps too facilely) have
charaaerized as a memory-based theory of personal identity. See Thomas Nagel, The View
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have justly noted the occurrence of Lockean ideas in Pope's remarks
on personal identity (in, for example, the Epistle to Cobham)P the
treatments of Stack and others amply demonstrate the dominance of
the ancient perspective on the problem in the Imitations. Moreover,
I believe that Pope's tendency to view personal identity as a challenge
for those who seek the good life quite precisely signals his preference
for ancient (that is, Roman Republican, and hence, according to
Pocock, anti-commercial, Tory, and "civic") styles of thought over
modern ones.
One of the most thorough cases in the Imitations for the virtues
of an "equal mind" is made in Pope's version of Horace's Nil
admirari. Epistle Ivi, which begins: "'NOT to Admire, is all the Art
I know, / 'To make men happy, and to keep them so.'" Stack says
of Horace's original that the "neat phrase 'Nil admirari' suggests the
ataraxia of the Epicureans or the apatheia of the Stoics, a calm
equanimity of mind, an absence of intense emotion" (207)." Even as
the poem recommends us to the good life, however, it seems to cast
doubt on our capacity to attain it, both renouncing various apparent
sources of happiness—wealth, popularity, power, food, love, and
others—and pointedly declining to represent good living otherwise
than negatively as the lack of admiration for such things. Pope even
shies from presenting an exemplary picture of a Stoic sage or
Christian saint adhering to a rigidly virtuous code, because "For
Vertue's self may too much Zeal be had / The worst of Madmen is
a Saint run mad" (26-7); nor does he come to celebrate (for example)
moderate Epicurean pleasures. Rather he somewhat obsessively
enumerates false goods and describes their inescapable power. Stack
neatly puts this paradox at the poem's heart in his appraisal of the
critical reception of Horace's original: "It is very striking...that while
modern critics discover sustained scepticism in this epistle, eighteenthcentury interpreters saw it as an expression of high moral idealism"
(210)."
From Nowhere (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1986), 32ff, for a discussion of the history
and current status of the debate.
See especially Christopher Fox's Locke and the Scriblerians (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1988).
" In Pope's period, of course, admiration retained Horace's Latin sense of an immoderate or
irrational fascination with something.
Stack sees the paradox as applicable to both Horace's original and Pope's imitation.
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A short solution to the dilemma is that ancient skepticism itself is
an expression of a kind of high moral idealism. Ataraxia is a key
term not just for the Epicureans (as Stack notes) but also for the
Skeptics, who use it to designate the unperturbable calm, the equal
mind essential to the virtuous life, that follows their procedures of
total doubt—the payoff that dignifies Pyrrhonism as a eudaemonistic
philosophy. It should be clear that I am not arguing that Pope or
Horace" explicitly sought to state Pyrrhonist principles. (Pope him
self would have definitely been uncomfortable declaring himself a
skeptic.) Nonetheless the view that Horace's poem represents a
skeptical perspective would have been familiar to Pope" from the
"Apology for Raimond de Sebonde''\_s\.c\^^ where Montaigne remarks:
Some say that our well being lies in Vertue, others in Pleasure,
others in our submitting to Nature: One in Knowledge,
another in being exempt from Pain, another in not suffering
ourselves to be carried away by Appearances: and this fancy
seems to have some relation to that of the Ancient Pythagoras:
Nil admirari prope res est una Numaci,
Solaque quae possit facere, & servare heatum.
Nothing t'admire's the only thing I know
Can make us happy, and can keep us so.
Which is the drift of the Pyrrhonian Sect. (2:407)"
Montaigne continues to suggest that for him Horace's poem expresses
the beliefs of "the Pyrrhonians...[who] say that the Ataraxy, which is
Commentators on Horace discuss his relationship to Skepticism as a school of thought far
less than they interpret influences on him of the Stoic, Epicurean, or even Cyrenaic schools.
This is true perhaps because the tendency toward skeptical doubt represented by the
Academy in the 1st century BC (and expressed, for example, by Cicero in his Academical
44-45 BC) seems less integrated than the tendencies of the other schools—though Niall Rudd
in his Satires of Horace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) avers that "by the
time when Horace was writing his Satires..x\\.t distinctions between the main philosophical
schools had become blurred on a number of points" (19).
For an account of Pope's relationship to Montaigne and his annotations in his edition of
the Essais, see Maynard Mack's Collect^ in Himself (Newark: University of Delaware Press,
1982), 318-9 -dixA passim^ and 426-431.
From Charles Cotton's translation, Essays of Michael Seingeur de Montaigne^ in Three Books
(London: Gillyflower et al.y 1685-93)—the edition that Pope owned and read.
This English translation of the two lines is not Thomas Creech's, whom Pope credits as
his source in lines 3-4, but perhaps represents Cotton's own effort.
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the Immobility of Judgment, is the sovereign Good" (2:410).
Whether or not Pope was thinking of Montaigne's skeptical tract as
he imitated Episde Ivi, the poem's coupling of an idealistic promotion
of the good with its reluctance to offer a philosophically tenable
alternative to admiration replicates the Pyrrhonist program fairly
exactly.
In the ancient skeptic's view, any such alternative, any positive
definition or depiction of the good, would be just another emptily
admirable (and hence dubious) version of the truth. He must instead
find the good by maintaining his doubt. As Sextus Empiricus writes
in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism-.
Our assertion up to now is that the Sceptic's end, where
matters of opinion are concerned, is mental tranquillity
[ataraxia]: in the realm of things unavoidable, moderation of
feeling is the end. His initial purpose in philosophizing was to
pronounce judgement on appearances. He wished to find out
which are true and which false, so as to attain mental
tranquillity. In doing so, he met with contradicting alternatives
of equal force. Since he could not decide between them, he
withheld judgement. Upon his suspension of judgement there
followed, by chance, mental tranquillity in matters of opin-

Sextus's conception of opinion applies beyond matters of mere factual
truth and falsity, extending to any sort of gratification which we
(mistakenly) think equals true happiness. For Sextus, such faith in
our desires amounts to the opinion "that anything is by nature good
or bad":
When [a person] lacks those things which seem to him to be
good, he believes he is being pursued, as if by the Furies, by
those things which are by nature bad, and pursues what he
believes to be good things. But when he has acquired them, he
encounters further perturbations...because his elation at the
acquisition is unreasonable and immoderate, and also because
" From Sextus Empiricus: Selections from the Major Writings (Cambridge: Avatar, 1985),
Stanford G. Etheridge, trans., Philip P. Hallie, ed., 41.
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in his fear of a reversal all his exertions go to prevent the loss
of the things which seem to him to be good. (41)

Pope's poem develops just this theme. Any attained pleasure betrays
us to personal inconsistency and "perturbations" because unsettling
fears of being deprived of it attends it by definition; "If weak the
pleasure that from these [illusory goods] can spring / The fear to
want them is as weak a thing; / Whether we dread, or whether we de
sire, / In either case, believe me, we admire" (18-21). Throughout
Pope emphasizes the "immoderate" tendencies of admiration, for
example, of wealth: "If Wealth alone then make and keep us blest,
/ Still, still be getting, never, never rest" (95-6). While admiration is
strong enough to carry us to any extreme, it is simultaneously "weak"
because it is unsteady and unsteadying.
But the poem most significantly reflects Sextus's procedure by
uniting the skeptical disinclination to state any possible alternative to
admiration with an attempt to free us from it: such freedom arises (if
at all) like the skeptic's ataraxia, not by philosophical design or
precept but "by chance," after we are confronted with various
powerful but ultimately empty and unstable desires. The poem's
guiding double irony exacts this paradoxical dynamic. At line 28,
Horace has "I nunc, argentum & marmor vetus, aeraque & artes /
SM5pice"(17-18),^® which Pope renders as "Go then, and if you can, ad
mire the state / Of beaming diamonds, and reflected plate" (28-9).
The irony of such advice, which composes the body of the poem, lies
not just in its being so obviously bad—to heed it will pointedly not
"make men happy"—but also in the fact that to advise anyone to
admire something is a kind of category mistake: part of the joke is
that Pope and Horace prescribe various self-absorbing feelings as if the
addressee could rationally will to have or not to have them. Pope's
addition of the phrase "and if you can" underscores this suggestion,
acknowledging that rational will, that is, the faculty that
"philosophical" advice engages, cannot direct our admirations. One
simply is or is not the type of person who can get excited by fine
material objects. The same joke subsequently appears in oblique
references to our passivity before our passions, for example, when
I use the Latin text that Pope himself had printed with his imitation, following its
italicizations, as reprinted in the 7E, vol. 4.
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Pope tells us to "Be struck by bright Brocade" (32), or admits that "If
not so pleas'd"(34) we will turn to something else. No doubt these
carry the subsidiary meaning that admirations can be acquired and
cultivated. But the oddness of being told to "Be struck" by something
comes from our awareness that we cannot really choose what is or is
not striking to us. In a backhanded way, then, the ironic
recommendations play on admiration's power. Though they
implicitly advise us to do the opposite of what they say (for example
do not admire diamonds), they also suggest that no amount of mere
good advice can free us completely from admiration.
Similarly, the skeptic concedes admiration's ubiquitous "force." In
fact he requires it to attain ataraxia-. because admiration is too
powerful to be actively dispelled, the skeptic must use its power
against itself to escape it. He allows destabilizing desires to operate,
as it were, within him, that they may cancel each other out, purging
him of them and landing him as if accidentally in the state of ataraxia
he wanted from the beginning. Pope also uses desire against itself in
a pattern taken up through a large part of the advice to come. He
first asks a general question about the addressee's proclivities and then
recommends that these be exacerbated to hideous extremes; "But art
thou one whom new opinions sway...? Fly then, on all the wings of
wild desire! / Admire whate'er the maddest can admire" (63-8); "Is
Wealth thy passion? Hence! from Pole to Pole...Advance thy golden
Mountain to the skies" (69-73); "But if to Pow'r and Place your
Passion lye...Then hire a Slave, (or if you will, a Lord)" (97-9); and
so on. First, the questions emphasize admiration's power by
assuming that it already dominates us in one form or another. But
they also clarify the moral purpose of Pope's irony: after identifying
one of our possible propensities toward vice, he represents it in an
exaggerated caricature to uncover its emptiness—as a reductio ad
absurdum asks us to exaggerate a false principle we believe in to get
us to stop believing it. In this sense his advice is sincere: he wants
us to view as vividly as possible the grotesque extremities of lust,
greed, and the rest, to purge our own less exaggerated lusts and greedi
ness.
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Thus though the poem's advice seems at one level to insist on ad
miration's power over rationality," the poem's irony seeks an aloof
mastery over the admirations it depicts; Pope asks us to pursue false
goods hypothetically as a kind of thought experiment, in order to
impart an especially skeptical wisdom to us, which consists in being
tranquilly detached from them without substituting any stated good
in their place. The skeptic Carneades spectacularly illustrated this
technique in a famous episode from antiquity, when he argued in 155
BC at Rome one day in favor of justice and the next against it: his
ai^uing both sides of the case demonstrated his lack of admiration for
either without afhrming any third position of his own.^° Like Pope,
Carneades obviously does not believe in what he recommends. He
practices epoche, the withholding of assent, an ironic bracketing of
each side even as he presents it. But nonetheless the propensity of
our minds to be swayed by passions and opinions is essential for us
to make our chance discovery of ataraxia: we need to be in some
sense sincerely convinced of one version of the truth and then equally
convinced of another. Our argumentative personae can cancel each
other out only if we hold each with a measure of candor. Like
Pope's irony in this epistle, the skeptical procedure functions through
a dual recognition of the power and weakness of admiration.
Thus while skepticism offers us an "equal mind," a steadied
identity, it does so by forcing us to acknowledge or even cultivate a
special kind of self-division. When Carneades switches from justice
to injustice, he presents us with an especially exaggerated, even
formalized picture of the inconstant person deplored by Stoics like
Seneca and satirized by Pope in the Epistles to Cobham and To a Lady.
Pope displays his own inconstancy throughout the Imitations— "each
Opinion with the next at strife / One ebb and flow of follies all my
Life" (£p. li, 11. 167-8)—but such admissions come to express, like
" If this suggestion seems to run against the general tenor of Pope's thought, we should
remind ourselves of similarly skeptical insistences throughout the Essay on Man and the Epistle
to Cohham (among other places) that passion (whether a ruling one or not) precedes and
directs the individual's rational will. See the Essay on Man's vacillations on the power of the
ruling passion versus reason beginning at line 133, Epistle 11, and the Epistle to Cobham's
pronouncement that "On human actions reason though you can, / It may be reason, but it
is not man" (36-7).
™ For a description of Carneades's tactics, and the skeptical precedents which made them
possible, see David Sedley's essay "The Motivation of Greek Skepticism" in The Skeptical
Tradition (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1983), Myles Burnyeat, ed., 9-29.
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Carneades s tactic, a sophisticated sense of self-control separate from
any and all opinions, which constitutes his superiority not only over
his inconstant satirical targets but also over any proud "sage" who
thinks escape from inconstancy is possible. This procedure depends
on what may well be an impracticable self-fragmentation: the ancient
skeptic in effect says (in philosopher Myles Burnyeat's words), "It is
thought within me that p, but I do not believe it."^' The I who
hovers apart from his own opinions, his beliefs and desires, attains a
ghostly equanimity at the expense of being expressible or even
representable, occluded by the various admirations constituting "him."
It may well be objected that the recommendations in Epistle Ivi
are too obviously ironic to generate the tension required for skeptical
ataraxia to arise. Rather they announce a lot of obvious vices that
Pope himself could never begin to admire, and thus by their very
crudeness establish an unskeptical. Stoic possibility of a complete,
rationally determined escape from admiration. Whether or not Pope
himself felt the pull of such admirations, his poem takes a turn at the
end that ambiguously connects him more closely with them:
Adieu—if this advice appear the worst.
E'en take the Counsel which I gave you first:
Or better Precepts if you can impart.
Why do, I'll follow them with all my heart. (126-33)
The irony of Pope's attitude to the body of advice given in the poem
floats off in a number of bewildering directions. He seems to throw
up his hands, refusing to privilege any advice thus far given. But the
conclusion does balance candor and irony in the way I am claiming
is affiliated with the skeptical procedure. Ambiguities of reference
again make it difficult to distinguish the serious from the ironic
advice: when Pope asks "if this advice appear the worst," we cannot
necessarily tell whether "this advice" refers to that immediately
preceding—"The Man that loves and laughs, must sure do well"
(129)—or to all the heavily sarcastic recommendations through the
body of the poem. Similarly, "the Council which I gave you first"
could mean again the poem's sarcasm or its sincere first injunction, to
Burnyeat s formula occurs in his important essay "Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?"
in Burnyeat, ed., 117-48.
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admire nothing. The latter possibility (which seems predominant to
me) mitigates Pope's commitment even to the notion of nil admirari
itself, now set against the advice to love and laugh as if our deciding
between them were a mere matter of taste. And in the same vein, his
parting promise to follow "better Precepts if you can impart...with all
my heart" opposes the sense that nil admirari is the last word, both
because he admits that some better advice may come along and
because following any advice with all one's heart smacks strongly of
admiration. The final reference to the heart reasserts the sincerity
shadowing Pope's irony that I associate with the skeptical procedure:
here and in other of the Imitations of Horace that offer wisdom and
advice. Pope fosters an ironic detachment by keeping the possibility
of candid, admiring engagement in belief alive.

^ II

^

The advice not to admire, not to define oneself too strictly by the
various opinions and passions passing through one at a given moment,
expresses a style of upper-class sophistication rather common in
Pope's period.^^ But I think that Pope also applies the skeptical
model beyond the realm of mere personal conduct to define the
nature of his poetic endeavors. In quite general terms, critics now
often recognize that skepticism helped shape notions about art
through the eighteenth century, as the aesthetic was increasingly seen
as irreducible to or radically separate from other more practical and
positive sorts of discourse—political, juridical, theological, ethical, or
otherwise. (Such accounts at times Whiggishly suggest that these
early impulses imperfectly anticipate Kant's definition in the third
Critique of the aesthetic attitude as essentially disinterested.^')
The attitude is recognizably "skeptical" in the diluted sense used by many
commentators—detached, circumspect, unaffected by passion while simultaneously conceding
passion's dominant role in human affairs, given a classic expression in Lord Chesterfield's
Letter to His Son. My claim is that Pope's evocation of this attitude in Epistle Ivi is more
precisely Pyrrhonistic than the cynical LaRouchefoucauldian or Machiavellian postures with
which it bears resemblance.
^ See section two of the Analytic of the Beautiful, "The Liking That Determines a Judgment
of Taste Is Devoid of All Interest," in the Critique of Judgment (1790, Indianapolis: Hackett,
1987), Werner S. Pluhar, trans., as well as the following sections in which Kant differentiates
aesthetic judgment not only from liking the "agreeable" but from liking the good as well.
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Aesthetic "truth" emerges negatively out of a skeptical distrust of
various modes of thought that promise knowledge: the arts come to
seem especially important in a world where skepticism demonstrates
the futility of applying to reason and evidence for certainty, if only
because aesthetic objects are seen as needing no justification other
than their own ultimately mysterious effects on us. An early instance
of this tendency often cited is the emergence in the late seventeenth
century of the je ne sais quoi (Pope's "nameless graces" in the Essay on
Criticism) as the exemplary poetic effect—and some like Howard
Caygill have recently connected its increasing prestige with the rising
importance of philosophical skepticism in French writing.^'' My idea
here in part is that skepticism's influence on Pope makes it plausible
for us to situate his poetry within this general development.
Many critics have in fact used the term "skepticism" to
characterize the source of Pope's poetic interest in the less stable
elements of his culture: Thomas Edwards, for instance, suggests that
Pope cannot fully accept his own "Augustan synthesis" of values
because he is "the ungrateful heir of two hundred years of skepti
cism"—and that his poetry is the better for it;^^ while Fredric Bogel
at times treats the "skeptical imagination" as something that Pope
must confront and overcome in his drive toward "Augustan
knowledge.
Skepticism has often been seen to be inherently at
45ff.
See Caygill's Art of Judgement (Oxford: Blackweli, 1989), 38ff. Caygill sees the je ne sais
quoi as an essentially French effect that is included in the Shaftesburyan tradition of English
aesthetics but tempered by a confident, politically and morally efficacious providentialism.
I believe the works of Pope and of the Tory satirists in general persist in the more skeptical
French mode and hence stand in tension with the Addisonian standard of "taste and civil
society' that Caygill sees as predominant in the period.
See This Dark Estate, 2. Edwards often refers to skepticism specifically as the alternative
to Augustanism: for example he notes that in The Essay on Man that "a steady skeptical
undercurrent qualifies Pope's dogmatism" (32) and, more generally, comments on persisting
"signs of some uncertainty about the Augustan synthesis" (48).
See Bogel's Acts cf Knowledge: Pope's Later Poems (Lewisberg: Bucknell Univenity Press,
1981). Bogel views skepticism as a necessary but somewhat callow phase through which Pope
passes as he achieves his greatest poetic successes; for instance, he says that "in the Epistles
to Several Persons, taken as a whole, the skeptical imagination brooding on trivial surfaces,
is gradually led onward to a fuller humanity and a more fully humanized art" (45). As I
understand him, Bogel describes Pope's main epistemological position as a form of mitigated
skepticism or fallibilism: "The ideal of knowledge that the Augustan writer espoused was
likely to be a form of positive skepticism, the skepticism of a Dryden rather than of a
Pyrrhon [sic]. Such skepticism assumes that there is something significant in experience to
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odds with Pope's official world view—a foretaste, perhaps, of the Ro
manticism that would negate "Augustanism." A recent study. The
Rape of the Text (1993) by Harry Solomon, has argued more forcefully
for the presence in the Essay on Man of a type of skepticism very
much of Pope's time—but Solomon stresses the carefully mitigated
force of this skepticism, its avoidance of the radical doubts I have
been discussing7^ In very broad terms, however, there is general
agreement among many critics that skepticism does occupy a place
among the available cultural attitudes of Pope's time—and, I would
stress, within a recognizably neoclassical aesthetic, establishing calm
or poise in the face of the paradoxical or confusing: in To
Burlington's words, some paintings, poems, and landscapes "pleasingly
confound," offering a little "artful wildness to perplex the scene."
The cognitive terms perplex and confound reveal the crucial fink
between epistemological frustration and aesthetic pleasure. More
specifically in the Imitations, skepticism leads Pope to stress wild and
confounding elements of his personality, his paradoxical beliefs and
desires, thereby inviting critics like S. L. Goldberg to note similarities
between Pope's poetic identity and Romantic attitudes toward the
self—but instead of sublime, self-alienating fears. Pope's doubts grant
him the self-control so often associated with neoclassicism. An
analysis of ancient skepticism also uncovers a complex intellectual
background for the Imitations' self-explorations, a living tradition of
be known, and that what is significant is knowable, but it also assumes that the proportion
of misconception to true knowledge will be high" (222). While I think that there are a
number of problems with this assertion, Bogel and I agree at least on the idea that radical
doubt does appear as a force in Pope's (and, generally, Aug;ustan) thought-'and we differ most
deeply in our descriptions of the significance of its presence.
While this is not the place to offer a full-blown discussion of his argument, I think that
Solomon's definition of Pope's attitude as essentially an "Academic" one is somewhat
misleading, if we view Academic skepticism's distinctive trait (as Solomon does) to be its
assertion of probabilistic theories about experience—theories which Pope no where really
expresses. Pyrrhonism no less than Academicism is a philosophy that recommends a practical
acceptence of appearances, but it refuses the language of probability (among other types of
theories) to come to terms with them. Solomon's understanding of skepticism in the Essay
is in fact richer than one that would allow only the influence of such a narrowly conceived,
probablistic Academicism. But to admit as much would compromise his position because he
explicitly sets out to protea Pope's poetry (at least the Essa"^ from interpretations that
discover the presence of more radically destabilizing doubts within it. At any rate, Solomon's
book has much to teach us about the skeptical sources of the Essay^ as well as their literary
effects.

Skeptical Ataraxia and Selfhood in Pope

71

thought about paradoxes of identity and virtue, which, as Goldberg
admits, we cannot find if we read Pope as merely intuitively anticipat
ing the "philosophic and programmatic self-consciousness' of Ro
manticism.^®
The following account of some of the literary ramifications of
ancient skepticism in Pope perhaps stands in an oblique tension with
the work of Stanley Cavell, the most important recent writer on
skepticism and aesthetics, who consistently interprets texts in terms
of the modem skeptical tradition. In his Disowning Knowledge in Six
Plays of Shakespeare (1987), for instance, Cavell downplays the
considerable (and documentable) influence on Shakespeare of
Montaigne (who retains ties to the ancient mode), in favor of
comparing characteristically Shakespearean tragic effects to the
decidedly "modern" epistemological predicaments of Descartes:
However strong the presence of Montaigne and Montaigne's
skepticism is in various of Shakespeare's plays, the skeptical
problematic I have in mind is given its philosophical refine
ment in Descartes' way of raising the questions of God's exis
tence and of the immortality of the soul...The issue posed is no
longer, or not alone, as with earlier skepticism, how to conduct
oneself best in an uncertain world; the issue is how to live at
all in a groundless world. Our skepticism is a function of our
now illimitable desire.^'
Cavell in short wants to find a brand of skepticism at work in
Shakespearean tragedies compatible with the wrenching aesthetic
experience they present and one that points ahead to his own reading
of Romanticism. It is difficult to assess the import of Cavell's
dismissal of the relevance of "earlier skepticism" to his project. The
remark he could be taken to imply that the ancient mode ("how to
conduct oneself best in an uncertain world") is simply less severe
than modernity's confrontation with absolute groundlessness, a
merely expedient pose assumed toward a variety of uncertainties,
leaving some undoubted ground under our feet upon which we can
conduct our lives. This contrast could suggest that ancient skepticism
See Goldberg's essay "Integrity and Life in Pope's Poetry," in Mack and Winn, eds., 41-4.
Cavell, 1987, 3.
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fails to engage questions concerning intentionality, selfhood, and
reason radically enough to energize poetry in a way comparable to
the one that has interested Cavell in his literary criticism.
I think, however, that there is a strong sense in which this
implication (whether or not Cavell intends it) is mistaken. Pyrrhonistic skepticism is no less epistemologically radical than Cartesian fan
tasies about (for example) the malin genie that Cavell takes to
represent the modern type. Sextus seeks to show that we should
suspend judgment on everything, from God and immortality to the
most basic sensory appearances, including the way things look and
feel.'° And even treatments of relatively abstract questions in ancient
skepticism exact an intense self-alienation: when Carneades argued
both sides of the case, he expected the Romans to recognize his
procedure as an attack on the possibility not only of defining justice
but of rationally believing one's own behefs in general. The Romans
were duly shocked, perhaps no less than Descartes in the throes of his
own doubts—as in the First Meditation, where he exclaims (charac
teristically, for Cavell): "I realize so clearly that there are no con
clusive indications by which waking life can be distinguished from
sleep that I am quite astonished, and my bewilderment is such that it
is almost able to convince me that I am sleeping."'^ By contrast,
however, Carneades himself finds calm—which he intends to be exem
plary to a sophisticated few even as it outrages or mystifies the herd.
Much remains be said on the contrast between the two modes,
especially in their religious dimensions. But now it suffices to note
that ancient skepticism differs from the Cartesian type not so much
in the severity of its doubt or its power to astonish but in its claim
that certain people find themselves ("by chance") able to live and
thrive on it. Its elitism parallels what the "wit" of Augustan poetry
has commonly been seen to imply about its audience: people either
get it or they do not, as they similarly have or do not have taste, or
"sense." Such elite capacities differ pivotally from the ability to apply
rules of poetic composition or critical judgment, or agree to some
See Gisela Striker's essay "The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus," in The Skeptical Tradition,
Burnyeat, ed., 95-115, which explores the epistemological difference between the
"undecidability" and the "relativity" of impressions, as asserted in the arguments of Sextus and
other ancient skeptics.
" Descartes, from the First Meditation, quoted by Stanley Cavell in Disowning Knowledge in
Six Plays of Shakespeare (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1987) 128.
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non-self-contradictory proposition (and from other things that
everyone in principle can do).
Ancient skepticism's extremity, moreover, has long been
recognized. From its inception. Stoics and others have criticized
Pyrrhonism precisely because its doubts are too radical to sustain,
charging that the very stability of the skeptics' lives (for example,
their tendency to get out of the way of approaching dog-carts)
confutes their position. Perhaps Cavell's dismissal of it has ties to
this tradition of criticism: central to his project is the idea that
modern skepticism is inherently incompatible with ordinary life, and
he may find the ancient mode's promise to unite the two shallow or
somehow false to the human predicament, at least since Descartes.
Pope's tendency in the Imitations to detach himself from his beliefs
and desires (also to be found elsewhere, I think, in many other writers
of the period") could seem to amount to a trivial kind of bad faith.
This tradition of attack on the ancient mode has recently been
considered by Myles Burnyeat in his important essay "Can the
Skeptic Live His Skepticism?" He comes to answer his title question
in the negative, arguing that Sextus's program requires the skeptic to
do something impossible: detach himself from the person (namely
himself) who finds an argument convincing, "treating his own thought
as if it were the thought of someone else...saying, in effect, [as I
quoted above] 'It is thought within me thatp, but / do not believe it'"
(140). This operation is particularly difficult to perform when the
aiguments to be found provisionally (but not ultimately) convincing
are the very skeptical ones that motivate the operation in the first
place. Burnyeat concludes that while such an attitude may be struck
fitfully, it cannot extend through a person's whole life—and therefore
that ancient skepticism is deeply incoherent. In this his position
resonates with characteristically modern depictions (including
" See, for example, Gibbon's approving portrait of "The philosopher, who considered the
system of polytheism as a composition of human fraud and error, [and] could disguise a smile
of contempt under the mask of devotion without apprehending that either the mockery or
the compliance would expose him to the resentment of any invisible or, as he conceived
them, imaginary powers." Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-88, London; Penguin,
1980 [abridged]), Dero A. Saunders, ed., 269. The philosopher here assumes a comfortable
skeptical attitude to live in bad faith quite literally.
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Descartes' and Hume's") of skepticism as intolerable or otherwise
unlivable.
But insofar as Pope purveys ironic epoche as specially definitive of
moments of aesthetic insight and not as a sustained attitude toward
the world, these charges seem less relevant. Again, the sequestering
of such effects in the literary sphere justifies its claim to differ signifi
cantly from philosophy, politics, ethics, religion, and other skeptically
questionable discourses, as well as from ordinary language itself.
Some of the most famous moments in the Imitations reveal the
specifically literary applications of Pope's epoche-like attempts to de
tach himself from any potentially stable self-portrayals. To para
phrase Burnyeat: Pope's model of the poetic attitude demands that
while a number of contradictory notions are thought within the poet,
he himself never necessarily believes (or disbelieves) them. The bur
den falls upon skepticism not to produce a life-sustaining wisdom but
rather moments of aesthetic pleasure, which arise from the poet's
simultaneous engagement in and freedom from various beliefs and
desires (what Sextus calls opinions) operating within him.
One of the most complex of Pope's remarks on himself as a writer
comes in his first effort at imitating Horace, Satire Hi. As is common
in the Imitations, the poem presents justifications for Pope's satirical
poetry with bewilderingly various degrees of irony. Central to them
is his claim that poetic self-expression is his peculiar "Pleasure" (45):
I love to pour out all myself, as plain
As downright Shippen, or as old Montagne.
In them as certain to be lov'd as seen.
The Soul stood forth, nor kept a Thought within;
In me what Spots (for Spots I have) appear,
Will prove at least the Medium must be clear.
In this impartial Glass, my Muse intends
See David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (1738, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1
263ff (Book I, Sect. VII), in which Hume narrates his reentry into ordinary life after his
skeptical reasonings: After "the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most
general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any
proposition," we dine and converse and play backgammon, and find that philosophy leaves
us cold. He continues: "Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin'd to
live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of life...the course of my
animal spirits reduces me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world" (267-9).
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Fair to expose myself, my Foes, my Friends. (51-8)
It is difficult to visualize exactly the image of the self Pope is
presenting here, and this difficulty itself indicates the complexity of
his notions of poetic self-expression. (Horace's version is nowhere
near as elaborate, figuring the exposure of the self as on a votive
tablet.) Pope "pours out" himself presumably like fluid from a bottle.
But the fluid itself is an impersonal medium, "clear" of just the distin
guishing marks that make the self a self. His "Spots" (his moral
blemishes) distinguish him as a particular person, but these are
crucially different from or inessential to the poetic part of the self
poured out.
It may seem that in addition to the "spots" and the medium. Pope
asks us to visualize a third item, a picture of his personal soul to
which the spots adhere, "standing forth" like the souls of Shippen and
Montaigne. This may or may not be right. But Pope mentions only
the medium and the infelicitous spots that set off its
transparency—and it is only the spots that prove the clarity of the
fluid, not Pope's full self-portrait, spots and all. In any case, the
crucial point is that the clear medium seems to stand not only for
Pope's poetic language, in all its impersonal, unprejudiced accuracy,
nor merely the purity of his style (though this may be a large part
of it)—but for a specially heightened, cleansed, fluid version of
himself: that is, the self-as-poet, here essentially contrasted with the
ordinary self represented as the "spots" or personal flaws which
appear in it. The self-as-poet exposes everyone, including the
ordinary Pope ("myself") who is flawed by inconsistencies, while
remaining purely and consistently distinct from the vices, affections,
and (as we find next) the "present Age" (59) shown in it. Like the
ancient skeptic, the self-as-poet is the bearer of various potentially selfdistinguishing attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and vices, yet discovers a
capacity to detach himself radically from them.
And poetic writing itself is specifically the medium through which
this "detaching" happens: Pope says that his "Muse intends" the
exposures appearing in his work. His relinquishment of intention of
course is another way of insisting on the clarity of the poetic
medium: his own personal agenda cannot color his poetry because
his poetry succeeds only when the muse takes over and thereby
transcends (while including) his personality. He thus associates
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himself with the tradition (familiar from Socrates' remarks on the
poets in the Apology onward) defining poetry as anti-intellectual, here
to the point of denying the personal intentionality of the poet. And
more specifically, such a denial resonates with the skeptical model.
Cavell has ai^ued throughout his career that the modern skeptic does
not really "mean what he says." Skeptical doubt removes us from the
ordinary uses of language into a bizarre, hyperbolized realm where
our words insist upon something we cannot want: an absolute cer
tainty that negates the finite conditions of our humanity.^^
Skepticism as it were speaks through those who are caught up in it,
forcing them to detach their words from ordinary usages and con
texts, Similarly, the poetic process in Pope entails his detachment
from the ordinary conditions of selfhood—from his "spots." These
can appear with proper literary accuracy only if against a hyperbolically pure, "impartial" part of him- Like Cavell's skeptic. Pope pays
for this purification by sacrificing nothing less than his intentional
powers. But instead of viewing this loss as a terrible alienation from
his ordinary self. Pope sees it as a kind of inspiration: the muse
allows him to register his spots happily without "meaning them" selfdefinitively, As I noted above, ancient sl^pticism claims an affective
result that is simply different than the anxiety and alienation cited by
Cavpll as pharacteristic qf the ntpdern kind. While intentionlessness
for Cavell ("not meaning what we say") is the disturbing outcome of
modern skepticism, it is just the state prized by the ancient skeptic,
and just the state to which Pope as a neoclassical poet aspires.
For example, the skeptic says, "You don't really see that apple on the table, you see only
one side of it," or "You see only a sense-impression of it," or "You could be dreaming you
see it," 6cc.—such remarks alienate us from our ordinary grasp of what it means to see an
apple. See Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1969), especially the title essay, and parts 1 and 2 of The Claim of Reason (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979). Following Wittgenstein, Cavell has throughout his career
characteri^d philosophy in general and skepticism in particular as an alienation from
ordinary language: once the Wht^nsteinian "criteria" that shape ordinary language are left
behind as we philosophize, we lose a grip on the meanings of our words and drift free of
intended pr deterniined meanirig. So far as I know, Cavell never baldly defines poetry as a
departure frorp ordinary language that is essentially equivalent to skepticism's departures from
it. Npr would I. But Cavell does say that skeptical alienation from ordinary language
occasions sublirne, tragic, and other decidedly "aesthetic" moments. And I agree that poets
do use skeptical strategies to distinguish their work from ordinary discourse and thereby
earmark it as poetic.
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As the passage develops, it becomes clear that Pope somehow
identifies his literary self with the transparently impersonal fluid:
My Head and Heart thus flowing thro' my Quill,
Verse-man or Prose-man, term me what you will.
Papist or Protestant, or both between,
Like good Erasmus in an honest Mean,
In Moderation placing all my Glory,
While Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory. (63-8)
The fluidity of the "Head and Heart" again distinguishes him from
the nonfluid spots carried with them. Pope remarks in his Thoughts
on Various Subjects recorded by Spence that "The best way to prove
the clearness of our mind, is by shewing its faults; as when a stream
discovers the dirt at the bottom, it convinces us of the transparency
and purity of the water."" In this image as well, the fluidity and
clarity of the "mind" contrasts with the opacity and stasis of the dirt:
Pope's literary self indicates his faults by being radically distinct from
them. While he would aver that candidly revealing his spots is at
least as important in his writing as proving his mental transparency,
the two function in tandem. Mental transparency, furthermore, is a
value itself: while it is good for revealing a writer's flaws, the flaws
are paradoxically "good" insofar as they "prove the clearness of our
mind."
It may seem that Pope's location of himself in the above passage
at an "honest Mean" between various pairs of extremes amounts to a
positive characterization of his attitude as a writer: he posits
moderation as a tangible value with which he identifies. But the
proliferation of labels in the passage and his profession of indifference
about which are applied to him suggests not his effort to compromise
but rather the inessentiality to his literary self of any and all
identifying labels. He does not declare that he will seek a mean
between being a Catholic and being a Protestant, but that he does not
care whether he is labeled one or the other or "both between." The
reference to Erasmus is telling: his "honest Mean," as Pope was well
aware, did not express itself doctrinally, for Erasmus always ac
knowledges (in his words) "a Church to which I willingly submit my
' See TEy vol. 4, 9.
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own views, whether I attain what she prescribes or not."^^ Rather
moderation defines Erasmus's famously tolerant temperament, his eschewal of passionate, angry debate, and his reluctance to dogmatize:
"so great is my dislike of assertions that I prefer the views of the
sceptics wherever the inviolable authority of Scripture and the deci
sion of the Church permit"(6). Erasmus's attitude is a Christianized
(and therefore less radically detached) version of ancient skepticism,
which dictates that the skeptic will adopt the traditions and practices
of his country on the basis not of internal conviction but of external
authority. Pope here unlike Erasmus refuses to identify exclusively
with any religion, or any political party for that matter. While
variously identifiable attitudes find expression in the poetic medium,
the "Glass," the fluid, reflecting literary self, remains "impartial."
This duality of Pope's self as it appears in his writing recalls the
characteristic literary attitude of the other great Renaissance skeptic
mentioned in the passage, Montaigne. Throughout the Essais,
Montaigne pours himself out, famously declaring his book consubstantial with its author. Like Pope, Montaigne exhibits a
bewildering variety of shifting attitudes, often admitting his radical in
constancy, as he does in "Of Vanity": "I now, and I anon, are two
several Persons." Nonetheless, he does not intend this to negate the
principle announced moments earlier in the same essay— "My Book
is always the same" (3:302-3). Like Pope, Montaigne claims to
achieve a purity and tranquillity of self through writing that
paradoxically exposes the self's impurities, disunity, and divagations.
As in Pope, Montaigne's characteristically candid admission of his
spots proves the "clarity" and integrity of the medium of the work.
Jean Starobinski comments in his Montaigne in Motion (1982):
Division [in Montaigne's self] cannot be overcome...The only
recourse remaining to anyone still enamoured of unity is to
establish it in the discourse that gives voice to change, in the
judgment that describes and condemns (or excuses) variability.
The project of that discourse is no longer to achieve moral
stability but to explain "how" and "why" stability has vanished.
" That is, of course, the Roman Catholic one. Erasmus, Diatribe seu collatio de lihero
arhitrario (1524), in Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will (New York: Ungar, 1962), Ernest
F. Winter, trans., 6.
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to indicate what obstacles have prevented the desired repose
from being attained and caused the mirage of a transparent,
univocal, and simple wisdom to recede into the distance. The
book is a unitary receptacle capable of encompassing diversity.
Writing, though it spins itself out in one continuous thread, is
not incompatible with the mutability of humours, the clash of
contradictory ideas, "passage," movement, travel.'^
Both Pope and Montaigne seek an elusive unity of self that can only
appear behind a foreground of disunity:
writing for both
"encompasses diversity" in a way that subscribing to a univocal philo
sophical position cannot. And in this search they find their ideal in
the skeptic, who cultivates any number of contradictory beliefs and
personal variations to "prove" his own animus cequus. Unlike the
tranquil self composed by the Stoic sage, who renders himself
consistent by embracing virtue and shunning vicious discontinuity,
the skeptic's tranquil self is produced by a sustained interaction
between his vices of the moment and a transcendent vicelessness. As
Pope demonstrated in his handling of the Nil admirari, we require the
ever recurring, ever shifting dictations of admiring passions in order
to separate ourselves decisively from them.
It is true that later in Satire Hi (and through the Imitations
generally) Pope chooses moments to fix his role as a satirist, a heroic
and vatic voice distinguished amid the degradation of his times:
"arm'd for Virtue when I point the Pen, / Brand the bold Front of
shameless, guilty Men, / Dash the proud Gamester in his gilded Car,
/ Bare the mean Heart that lurks beneath a Star" (105-108). But even
at such moments he tends to define his virtue with negatives, noting
that it consists largely in his resistance to certain identifying labels—he
is "Un-plac'd, un-pension'd, no Man's Heir, or Slave" (115). Perhaps
more significant are the ambiguities into which he glides at the end
of the poem: like the ironies concluding Epistle Ivi, Pope's remarks
here preserve a sense of moral purpose even as they render it
impossible to define exactly. He denies that he will write morally
suspect "Libels and Satires," and says instead he will produce "grave
Epistles, bringing Vice to light...Such as Sir Robert would approve—"
Jean Starobinski, Montaigne in Motion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), Arthur
Goldhammer, trans., 27.
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(150-3). Of course Pope means us to recognize that staking the moral
efficacy of his poems on their power to inspire Walpole's approval
itself implies a contradiction: the vices to be brought to light in them
are those of Walpole himself and the "shameless, guilty men" he leads.
We are left wondering whether Pope means to retain or undercut his
previous rejection of libel, especially since his joke here somewhat libelously presupposes the absurdity of enlisting Sir Robert in the cause
of morality. This equivocation thus destabilizes Pope's very claim to
occupy his morally secure position as a writer of "grave Epistles."
Nonetheless, he does not intend us to wonder seriously if he is
perhaps just as bad as Walpole (in part because the joke after all is
predicated on an assumption of Walpole's moral inferiority). Pope's
irony paradoxically withdraws the possibility of fixing his moral
center without compromising his superior moral status; the poetic
medium itself expresses a kind of aloof moral purity, exposing both
his inclination to libel and his moralistic pretensions, without strictly
defining him in either mode.
His denials that he associates this free-floating state of mind
particularly with the writing of verse do not, I think, obliterate the
connection between ataraxia and his notion of the literary attitude in
the larger sense. Though he claims to be impartial about whether we
identify him as a "Verse-man" or a "Prose-man" (or as anything else),
he of course has also announced that his "Muse intends" exactly this
sort of impartiality. Nonetheless, this tension between writing poeti
cally (according to the Muse's dictates) and his indifference to (being
perceived as) writing poetically is not merely accidental. The
skeptical operation I have been describing guarantees that Pope can
never securely characterize his poetry as the instantiation or achieved
expression of wisdom. Skepticism itself forbids the representation of
personal security, and "verse" can no more ground identity than can
a dogmatic philosophical position.
This skeptical dynamic of refusal goes some way toward
accounting for the fact that throughout the 1730s Pope is repeatedly
turning away from verse toward some vaguely hoped-for philosophy
that will stabilize his identity (for example in Satire Hi, 1733, The
Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot., 1734, esp. 11. 271ff, Epistle Ilii, 1737, esp. 11.
198ff, and Epistle li, 1738). Pope's repudiation of verse comes to be
a frozen gesture—as if writing poetry of self-questioning entails
questioning the point of doing it at all. Nonetheless, Pope also subtly
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and not so subtly mocks the philosophical promised land—"What
right, what true, what fit, we justly call" {Episde /i)—to be found
beyond the verge of the self-repudiating poem. This double attitude
toward poetry and the philosophical recalls Montaigne's oscillation
between rejections of and insistences on his own foolish inconsis
tency.
The most striking illustration of this attitude occurs in the
imitation of Epistle li. Horace's repudiation of poetry in his version
makes more plain sense at this point in his career than Pope's:
Horace is bidding farewell specifically to lyric poetry and is beginning
to write verse epistles because he hopes they will be more philosophi
cally edifying. But Pope has been writing verse epistles all along. As
it happens, this turns out to be his last imitation of Horace, and so
the farewell here carries a very different significance than the one in
the original: "Farewell then Verse, and Love, and ev'ry Toy / The
rhymes and rattles of the Man or Boy" (17-8). Unlike Horace, Pope
here is apparently rejecting poetry of the very same generic type
(epistolary / satirical) as the one he is currently engaged in writing,
which lends an irony to his "farewell" not to be found in the original.
Not surprisingly, the philosophical attitude he now names as his
chosen alternative to poetry matches the one longed-for in earlier
poems. He has asked for peace and retirement in the poem's opening
lines, to fade into "Life's cool evening satiate of applause" (9), but the
philosopher's life he expects to lead in fact contrasts sharply with
cozy self-containment:
But ask not, to what Doctors I apply,'
Sworn to no Master, of no Sect am I:
As drives the storm, at any door I knock,
And house with Montague now, or now with Lock,
Sometimes a Patriot, active in debate.
Mix with the World, and battle for the State,
Free as young Lyttleton, her cause pursue.
Still true to Virtue, and as warm as true:
Sometimes, with Aristippus, or St. Paul,
Indulge my Candor, and grow all to all.
Back to my native Moderation slide.
And win my way by yielding to the tyde. (23-34)
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Here he describes his characteristic patchwork of intellectual
sympathies, and depending on how starkly contradictory we find
Lacke and Montaigne, or Aristippus and St. Paul, Pope can seem
again to be invoking the model of the skeptical self's relation to
beliefs: any self that can in the same breath claim (potential)
sympathy with both Aristippus (the Cyrenaic hedonist) and St. Paul
cannot strictly speaking believe in them because the doctrine of each
excludes the other. Instead of swearing allegiance to either or both.
Pope is as it were predicting that these doctrines will be believed in
him (to vary Burnyeat's formula) in a way that skeptically withholds
wholehearted belief, unwilling to bind himself to either consistently
as an expression of his identity.
More telling perhaps is the bizarre kind of agency disclosed in the
passage. Pope writes, "As drives the storm, at any door I knock," but
what is the storm a metaphor for? Presumably his own stormy
inclinations: he will read whatever he feels like reading at any given
moment. But this way of putting it posits a division in himself, one
part of him, his whims, buffeting the / about. The storm cannot
stand for forces other than the self, or the outside world in general,
for the passage is elaborating on Pope's intellectual independence, on
the idea that he is "Sworn to no Master." Furthermore he finds
himself driven by the storm sometimes to "Mix with the world" and
sometimes to withdraw. If the storm driving him were the world he
would always be mixing with it. So his attempts to gain wisdom will
not necessarily lead either outward into the world or into sheltered
repose, but will rather expose his personality to its own stormy
discontinuities. This division of self is even clearer in the line
concluding the passage, when Pope predicts he will "win (his) way by
yielding to the tyde." Again, we wonder what the metaphorical
outside force stands for, and again, since the passage is all about his
pursuit of wisdom, it seems to me that the answer is simply his own
inclinations. Translated then, the sense would be, "I'll attain my goal
by surrendering to my whims." As before. Pope is not (or not
merely) saying "I'll read what I like" in an oblique way, but rather
noting a division in himself that produces a kind of self-defining (and
hence self-stabilizing) tension. He recognizes that his intellectual
whims are and will be inconsistent and sometimes starkly
contradictory, but instead of trying to stifle them he yields to them,
thereby winning a wisdom higher than any representable as a single.
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fixed position. Again, the skeptical acknowledgment of deep divisions
in the self result not in panic but in the recognizably Popean brand
of self-confidence.
This mood permeates the poem's conclusion, when he again
stresses his contradictory nature. He reproves Bolingbroke for being
more critical of his inconsistent dress than his inconsistent
personality:
...when no Prelate's Lawn with Hair-shirt lin'd.
Is half so incoherent as my Mind,
When (each Opinion with the next at strife.
One ebb and flow of follies all my Life)
I plant, root up, I build, and then confound.
Turn round to square, and square again to round;
You never change one muscle of your face.
You think this Madness but a common case. (165-72)
Pope himself has in fact just pointed out that this protean madness is
a common case, affecting both rich and poor (153-4), so his complaint
that Bolingbroke does not recognize the unique severity of his condi
tion rings with irony. But it is this irony itself that marks Pope's
difference from the satirical portraits of inconstants preceding. Their
inconstancy is driven by "some whimzy, or that Dev'l within /
Which guides all those who know not what they mean" (143-4).
Pope is similarly ruled at one level by forces beyond his own more
sober intentions: as in the earlier images of fluidity (the "tyde" and
the image of his poured-out self in Satire lit), his personality here is
moved by "One ebb and flow of follies all [his] life." But again, his
awareness of this coercion amounts to a self-mastery that others lack.
Insofar as he cannot escape the ebb and flow of his follies. Pope like
the common herd knows not what he means, but his confession of
incoherence reflects a special wisdom—which is essentially ironic
because it requires that he yield to inconstancy in order to master it.
The poem's final satirical stroke falls not upon unreflective people
"who know not what they mean" but upon the sage, "That Man
divine whom Wisdom calls her own" (180), the person who thinks he
can escape personal instability: "In short, that reas'ning, high,
immortal Thing / Just less than Jove, and much above a King, / Nay
half in Heav'n—except (what's mighty odd) / A fit of vapours clouds
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this Demi-god" (186-8). Pope demonstrates the inevitability of in
constancy by satirizing the so-called constant philosopher as well.
Though he began the poem by rejecting poetry because it seemed to
permit or encourage instability, he finally mocks philosophy because
it falsely promises that such a rejection is possible. But poetry
emerges only as an implicit positive because he never comes to assert
his final allegiance to it.
Such an assertion, moreover, would go too far in placing
unwarranted faith in poetry as the ground of his identity: the whole
point of associating his writing with the skeptical model of selfhood
is to derive the pleasure of self-control paradoxically by admitting his
lack of it. As he has suggested earlier in the poem, he can no more
promote poetry as a method to quell the fits endemic to human life
than philosophy: "Know, there are Words, and spells, which can
controll / (Between the Fits) this Fever of the soul: / Know, there are
Rhymes, which (fresh and fresh apply'd) / Will cure the arrant'st
Puppy of his Pride" (56-60). Of course the grim joke here lies in the
parenthetical deflations of the power of words and rhymes: fits will
always puncture our self-control regardless of our attempts to keep it,
attempts that we must constantly repeat to secure what little poise we
may gain. Like the sage discomfited by "A Fit a Vapours," the
rhymer cannot maintain his peace by an act of will: poetry cannot
be chosen as the path to the cequus animus any more than philosophy
can. As argued above, literary expression can produce calm only if
it chooses its subject, as it were, and not the other way around.
Pope's use of ancient skepticism to define his attitude toward
himself distinctively locates him in a long and varied tradition of
stressing the poet's impersonality. As I have suggested. Pope (like
other poets before and after him) is attracted to a notion to poetry
that operates on the poet as an impersonal process, allowing him to
voice a diversity of beliefs and feelings without opening him to the
charge of hypocrisy or irresponsibility. The poet registers his
opinions of the moment without being strictly accountable for them:
the particular features of his personality, his "spots," his self of the
moment, appear in a clear medium which renders them worthy of
general aesthetic appreciation—something they would not merit if
they appeared as the expression of a mere personality. While I am
not ready to assert that champions of theories of the (successful)
writer's essential impersonality (as diverse, for example, as the
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eighteenth-century Shakespeare commentators, Keats, T. S. Eliot, and
Paul de Man'®) generally promote such theories in an attempt to
justify poetry's claims as a kind of truth over against those of
dogmatic philosophy, I think that Pope does so in part for this
reason. The impersonal poet is impersonal because he has no beliefs,
or more precisely because he is the bearer of many beliefs without
admitting that any one of them can tell him who he is or what he
stands for. Of all types of beliefs, philosophical ones pretend to the
highest degree of generality and so in a sense seek to define and fix
the self most securely in the world. By describing the operation of
beliefs in him as an unintentional, ungrounded, and radically
discontinuous process, the impersonal poet declares his essentially
antiphilosophical nature.
Keats's famous letter to Richard Woodhouse [October 27, 1818] in which he defines "the
poetical Character" as chameleonlike, partaking of everything it meets, has often been
censured for its amorality, especially when Keats declares that "it is a very fact that not one
word I ever utter can he taken for granted as an opinion growing out of my identical
nature—how can it, when I have no nature?" Eliot of coutse spells out his impersonalist
theory in "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919): "Poetry is not a turning loose of
emotion, but an escape from emotion; it is not the expression of personality, but an escape
from personality." While it may be objected that de Man does not belong in this company,
the affiliation of his writing to skepticism has been noted, for example, in Eugene
Goodheart's The Skeptic Disposition in Modem Criticism (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1984), passim—and the similarities between Pyrrhonist ataraxia and the attitude ex
pressed in the following passage from Allegories of Reading (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1979) 173-4, are undeniable: "Within the epistemological labyrinth of figural
structures, recuperation of selfhood would be accomplished by the rigor with which the
discourse deconstructs the very notion of the self. The originator of this discourse is then
no longer the dupe of his own wishes: he is as far beyond pleasure and pain as he is beyond
good and evil or, for that matter, beyond strength and weakness. His consciousness is neither
happy nor unhappy, nor does he possess any power. He remains however a center of
authority to the extent that the very destructiveness of his ascetic reading testifies to the
validity of his interpretation. The dialectical reversal that transfers the authority from
experience into interpretation and transforms, by a hermeneutic process, the total
insignificance, the nothingness of the self into a new center of meaning, is a very familiar
gesture in contemporary thought, the ground of what is abusively called modernity." My
point in grouping these writers together is of course not to say that they all have the same
underlying understanding of the self and that Pope is the same as they are, but to indicate
that all differently apply a similar gesture, which many, including de Man, see as a
foundational gesture of "modernity": that is, figuring the self as the ever-elusive, essentially
paradoxical center of discourse—a practice in part established by Montaigne and, later and
rather differently, by Descartes. It should be clear from the foregoing that I see Pope's
version to be specifically identifiable in neoclassical terms of paradox and virtue not applicable
to Eliot or Keats or de Man.
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And of course skepticism enhances the prestige of poetry thus
characterized insofar as it purports to show that dogmatic philosophy
can never present the self with justified true beliefs. A poetry
emerging from the flow of the self's contradictory, unjustifiable beliefs
hence follows the only available avenue toward a generally "true"
attitude. Here I have tried to show why Pope finds ancient
skepticism a particularly congenial way to situate his writing in this
tradition of the impersonality of the aesthetic realm. As my discus
sion of his imitation of the Nil admirari showed, ancient skepticism's
eudaemonistic focus, its emphasis on virtue and wisdom distinguishing
it from more purely modern epistemological varieties, appeals to Pope
because virtue in whatever form is the sine qua non of his Horatian
attitude. While other brands of virtue appear in the Imitations, no
tably Stoic ones (for example, "Let Us be fix'd, and our own Masters
still," Satire Ilii, 180), ancient skepticism allows Pope to confess his
personal inconsistency and self-contradictions without sacrificing his
sense of virtuous superiority—and it is tempting to see skepticism as
dominant in the Imitations because it can subsume the wide variety
of shifting intellectual attitudes presented in them, including moments
of Stoicism, while Stoicism itself, in its self-definitive rigidity, cannot.
For those siding with the ancients and against the moderns in
Pope's time, the concept of virtue rooted in the ancient schools was
indispensable. Applying to ancient skeptical models allows Pope to
maintain his ideologically motivated connections to classical civic
virtue while radicalizing his poetic self-representation with
contradictions and paradoxes, diversifying it by changing his mind
abruptly and often, and mastering it with a hovering, superior irony.
His skepticism also helps determine the dominant feelings to be
generated by his poetry in himself and others, namely a pleasing,
contemplative sense of security in the face of the wild and
confounding—crucial elements, that is, in a neoclassical aesthetic.
Whether he could consistently hold this pose of detached amusement
at discontinuity, and keep his skepticism ancient while confronting an
irremediably modern world, would perhaps best be determined by an
analysis of his darker attitudes expressed in the Epilogues and the final
Dunciad.

